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I. INTRODUCTION
In August 2000, an old, industrial brownfield lot at Kendall Square
in Cambridge, Massachusetts began a transformation. Rising above the
site, a LEED1 certified platinum building now sits, housing the corporate
headquarters of Genzyme. This new building is part of a larger urban
revitalization project for the Kendall Square neighborhood.2 The trend is
not limited to Cambridge. Across the country, in Portland, Oregon, 409
blighted acres of former industrial and commercial shipping business
along the south waterfront are transformed into a green, urban
neighborhood.3 The revitalized neighborhood, and former brownfield, is
reconnected to the city center.
Brownfields are “real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or
reuse of which may be complicated by the presence of a hazardous
substance, pollutant, or contaminant.”4 Cleanup and reuse of brownfields
“protects the environment, reduces blight, and takes development pressure
off greenspaces and working lands.”5 Residential property values can
increase between 5-12.8 percent after brownfields cleanup.6 Additionally,
many brownfields are located within existing infrastructure, promoting
urban revitalization in a cost-effective manner.7 Brownfield cleanup and
redevelopment contributes to job growth and an increased tax base,
combats crime, and reduces pollution.8 It is estimated that there are more
than 450,000 brownfield sites in the United States.9
In 2002, the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields
Revitalization Act (the “Brownfield Amendments”) was enacted. The
stated purpose of the Act was to “provide relief … from liability under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act [CERCLA] of 1980, and to amend such act to promote the cleanup

1. Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design, U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL,
www.usgbc.org/leed (last visited Apr. 12, 2014).
2. Genzyme Center: Innovative Building for an Innovative Co., GENZYME CENTER,
www.genzymecenter.com/pdf/genzctr_background.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2014).
3. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA 560-F-12-013: BROWNFIELDS at a GLANCE
(2012), available at http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/success/portland_or_caruthers_brag.pdf.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(39) (2006).
5. Brownfields and Land Revitalization, EPA.GOV, http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/index.html
(last updated Sept. 26, 2014).
6. Id.
7. For more information on the impact of brownfields, see Infra. III.B.
8. Id.
9. EPA.GOV, supra, note 5. Some estimates put this number between 600,000 and 1,000,000.
See S. REP. NO. 107-244, at 2 (2002).
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and reuse of brownfields[.]”10 The amendments added an important
provision that sought to protect certain parties from CERCLA liability,
and became known as the Bona Fide Prospective Purchaser (BFPP)
defense. This defense would shield against liability as a potentially
responsible party (PRP) under CERCLA for developers acquiring
contaminated real property after January 11, 2002.11 This defense requires
the purported BFPP to establish eight criteria by a preponderance of the
evidence.12 One of the BFPP defense’s eight criteria requires showing an
exercise of “appropriate care with … hazardous substances … by taking
reasonable steps to” stop additional releases of hazardous substances, and
preventing or limiting exposure of the hazardous substances to humans,
the environment, or natural resources after acquiring the property.13
Prior to the amendments, the main defense against PRP liability was
for a party to claim status as an innocent landowner.14 This defense
required the party to show an exercise of “due care” by a preponderance
of the evidence with respect to the release or threat of release of any
hazardous substance.15 There was little to no explanation at the time of the
Amendments as to whether “appropriate care” and “due care” impose
different standards of care.
In 2013, the Fourth Circuit became the first federal appellate court to
interpret the scope of “appropriate care” under CERCLA’s BFPP defense
in a reported case. The Court held in PCS Nitrogen v. Ashley II that Ashley
II, the current owner of a portion of a former fertilizer facility, failed to
establish a BFPP defense for liability exemption.16 The Court affirmed the
District Court’s holding that Ashley II was a PRP through its failure to
establish a number of the eight criteria for the BFPP defense, including the
exercise of appropriate care.17 In doing so, the Court rejected Ashley II’s
argument that appropriate care was a lesser standard than due care. The
Court speculated that appropriate care might even be a higher standard
than due care, but ultimately held it to be at least as stringent as due care.18
The Fourth Circuit’s holding reflects a poor policy choice in light of
the stated goals of the Brownfield Amendments. In order to incentivize the
10. Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-118,
115 Stat. 236 (2002) (emphasis added).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(r)(1) (2002).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40)(A)-(H) (2002).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40)(D) (2002).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (2002).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (2002).
16. PCS Nitrogen v. Ashley II, 714 F.3d 161 (4th Cir. 2013).
17. Id.
18. Id.
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redevelopment of brownfields, the Environmental Protection Agency, or
Congress, should redefine the standard of care as one that imposes less
stringent duties on the prospective purchaser than due care. Appropriate
care should require the party asserting the BFPP defense to take the
minimal steps necessary to prevent imminent releases, cut off exposure
pathways, and stabilize existing conditions when these modest, immediate
measures could prevent the conditions from worsening. An appropriate
care standard that is less stringent than due care better effectuates the
policy goals of the Amendments and redevelopment of contaminated
properties in general. A lower standard for appropriate care is also
reflective of the quasi-utilitarian approach of many federal environmental
statutes.
If no action is taken to change the standard for imposing liability,
developers may be less inclined to undertake voluntary redevelopment of
contaminated properties if the risk of becoming liable as a PRP is uncertain
and not well defined.19 A different standard can act as yet another tool to
encourage private developers to take on redevelopment of brownfields
and, consequently, can provide economic benefits to the local community,
help reduce urban blight and urban sprawl, and protect greenfields.20 For
the foregoing reasons, the better policy choice for promoting
redevelopment of brownfields, and consequently lowering the brownfield
inventory, is a duty of care that is less than the due care standard under
CERCLA.
First, a brief discussion of PCS Nitrogen v. Ashley II will be used as
an entry point to examine the appropriate care standard under the BFPP
defense in CERCLA. Second, background on CERCLA liability schemes
and the Brownfields Amendments will be provided. Third, an argument
will be made in support of a lesser standard for appropriate care using the
history of the Brownfields Program and the Amendments, the need to
incentivize development of brownfields, and how a different standard is
harmonious with other environmental statutes in the United States. Along
with that discussion, limitations to this proposal’s incentivizing of
brownfields development will also be discussed. Finally, this paper will
address counterarguments to this new, proposed standard of care.

19. That party would lack knowledge sufficient to know the extent and thoroughness of cleanup
it must conduct at each stage of the redevelopment after acquisition of the facility.
20. A “greenfield” is simply land that is undeveloped. Unlike a brownfield, greenfield
development occurs on undeveloped land. See Greenfield, MERRIAM WEBSTER, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/greenfield (last visited October 25, 2014).
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II. THE CASE: PCS NITROGEN V. ASHLEY II
In PCS Nitrogen v. Ashley II, the Fourth Circuit became the first
federal court to interpret the scope of “appropriate care” under the BFPP
defense. Understandably, developers and environmental lawyers watched
this case closely because of the liability ramifications.21
The case involved the current site owner, Ashley II (Ashley),
bringing a cost recovery action against PCS Nitrogen, Inc. for costs it
incurred in hazardous waste cleanup at a former fertilizer-manufacturing
site.22 It was not disputed that Ashley incurred cleanup costs of hazardous
substances.23 The two parties disputed which one was liable as potentially
responsible parties (PRP) for cleanup costs of the hazardous wastes at the
site.24 The district court, in a bifurcated trial, held PCS Nitrogen as a PRP
in the first trial.25 Along with other parties, Ashley was also found liable
as a PRP and was allocated a portion of the response costs.26 Ashley
appealed the ruling.
At the first trial, the district court found that Ashley failed to establish
a number of the eight required criteria for the defense.27 The district court
held that Ashley’s failure to clean, fill, and cap sumps as well as remove,
monitor, or adequately address certain debris resulting from the demolition
of structures on site did not constitute “appropriate care.”28 Ashley’s own
expert admitted that the sumps should have been filled a year before they
actually were, and this delay was not the action that a “similarly situated
reasonable and prudent person would have taken.”29
On appeal, the Court reviewed Ashley’s BFPP defense. In particular,
the issue of whether Ashley exercised “appropriate care with respect to
hazardous substances found at the facility by taking reasonable steps to (i)
stop any continuing release; (ii) prevent any threatened future release; and

21. 4th Circuit Hears Oral Argument on Ashley II Case, SCHNAPF LLC (Jan. 4, 2013),
www.environmental-law.net/2013/01/4th-circuit-hears-oral-argument-on-ashley-ii-case/.
22. PCS Nitrogen v. Ashley II, 714 F.3d 161, 167 (4th Cir. 2013) [hereafter, “Ashley II”].
23. Id. at 172.
24. Id. at 167.
25. Id. The original operator of the ammonia and fertilizer plant at the site was Columbia
Nitrogen Corporation (“Old CNC”). “New CNC” was a corporation that purchased the plant on June
30, 1966. PCS Nitrogen, through a series of mergers and acquisitions, was a successor to New CNC.
PCS Nitrogen was a PRP by virtue of being a successor to New CNC. Id. at 169-73.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 180-81.
28. Id. at 180.
29. Id. at 181 (citing New York v. Lashins Arcade Co., 91 F.3d 353, 361 (2nd Cir. 1996)
(deciding whether a party “took all precautions with respect to the particular waste that a similarly
situated reasonable and prudent person would have taken in light of all relevant facts and
circumstances.”)).
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(iii) prevent or limit human, environmental, or natural resource exposure
to any previously released hazardous substance.”30 Ashley reiterated the
argument presented at trial that courts should apply a lesser standard of
care under appropriate care than due care.31 Ashley supported its
contention based on the purposes of the Brownfields Amendments, which
was to promote voluntary cleanup of contaminated property.32 Ashley
argued that “landowners will not undertake voluntary brownfields
redevelopment for fear of becoming fully liable for cleanup costs as a
result of minor mistakes that may not even contribute to harm at the
facility.”33
In the end, the Court rejected Ashley’s argument and upheld the
District Court’s ruling. The Court’s reasoning compared the “reasonable
steps” requirement found in both the innocent landowner defense and the
BFPP defense.34 The Court, relying on an Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) guidance document, held that appropriate care was at least
as stringent as due care.35 According to the EPA guidance, the “reasonable
steps” required under appropriate care is “consonant with traditional
common law principles and the existing CERCLA ‘due care’
requirements.”36 These “reasonable steps,” according to the Court,
required Ashley to fill the sumps earlier than it did in order to “prevent any
threatened future release.”37
Interestingly, the Court speculated that the BFPP appropriate care
mandate might require a higher standard of care than due care under the
innocent landowner defense.38 Logic, the Court reasoned, would suggest
that a landowner or developer acquiring property that is known to be
contaminated with hazardous substances should be held to a higher
standard of care.39 By contrast, an innocent landowner, who, by definition,
is not aware of the presence of hazardous substances prior to acquisition
of the facility, should be held to the lower standard.40
30. Id. at 180 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40)(D) (2002)).
31. Id. at 180.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. (citing Interim Guidance Regarding Criteria Landowners Must Meet in Order to Qualify
for Bona Fide Prospective Purchaser, Contiguous Property Owner, or Innocent Landowner
Limitations on CERCLA Liability, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Mar. 6, 2003),
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/common-elem-guide.pdf.
37. Supra note 22, at 181.
38. Id. at 180.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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While the Court likely reached the correct holding in light of EPA
guidance and the facts of the case41, a standard for appropriate care that is
more stringent than due care is inapposite to the purposes of the
Brownfields Amendments and the BFPP defense.42 Ashley correctly notes
that a higher standard of care, or simply a lack of clear limits on what
implicates liability, undermines the goals of the Amendments and
discourages redevelopment of brownfields.43
III. CERCLA, THE BROWNFIELDS PROGRAM, AND THE BROWNFIELD
AMENDMENTS
A. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA) provides a federal statutory mechanism for the
response, cleanup, and imposition of liability for hazardous waste sites and
emergency releases of hazardous substances.44 CERCLA permits the EPA
and other entities to clean up sites and seek out PRPs for costs when the
PRP either fails to clean up the contamination or cannot be located.45
CERCLA imposes strict liability, joint and several.46 The legal
classification of Potentially Responsible Parties (PRPs) covers a broad
category of individuals, including an owner and operator of a facility and
any person “who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arrange for disposal
… of hazardous substances[.]”47
Ordinarily, a prospective purchaser with knowledge of the
contamination is liable as a PRP once it acquires the property because it
now owns or operates a contaminated facility (e.g., a brownfield).
Additionally, under CERCLA’s strict liability scheme, the real estate

41. The District Court of South Carolina found that Ashley failed to establish by the
preponderance of the evidence another of the eight criteria for the BFPP defense. Specifically, Ashley
did not show sufficient evidence that no disposals occurred at the site after Ashley’s acquisition of the
facility. See Ashley II of Charleston, LLC v. PC Nitrogen, Inc., 791 F. Supp.2d 431, 499 (D.S.C.
2011).
42. Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-118,
115 Stat. 236 (2002).
43. Ashley II, 714 F.3d at 167.
44. Summary of CERCLA (Superfund), EPA.GOV, (Mar. 16, 2014), www.epa.gov/lawsregulations/summary-comprehensive-environmental-response-compensation-and-liability-act;
42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9614 (1980).
45. Id.
46. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167, 171-72 (4th Cir. 1988).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1991).
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transaction through which the BFPP acquires the brownfield may
constitute a “contract” by which the purchaser becomes a PRP.
B. The Brownfields Program: pre-Amendments
The EPA Brownfields Program started in 1995 as a means to
“empower states, communities, and other stakeholders in economic
redevelopment to work together in a timely manner to prevent, assess,
safely clean up, and sustainably reuse brownfields.”48 The EPA sought to
encourage brownfield development through a number of different
mechanisms, including providing grant money to local governments.49
Additionally, the EPA sought to encourage private development through
the use of Prospective Purchaser Agreements (PPAs).50 The PPAs were
negotiated between the agency and private parties and included a covenant
not to sue the prospective purchaser of the brownfield.51 Without a PPA,
a private developer risked liability through a number of ways, including
merely being an owner or a party to a real estate transaction.52 CERCLA’s
uncertain liability scheme is recognized as a major deterrent to potential
investors in brownfields.53 The PPAs were criticized as being ineffective
and cumbersome because they were subject to public comment and closely
scrutinized by the EPA, thus leading to lengthy delays in finalization.54
The PPAs were project-specific,55 thus tying up agency and developer
resources for each proposed project.
However, PPAs were largely the only means by which a private
developer could mitigate the disincentives and risks associated with

48.
Basic
Information,
Brownfields
and
Land
Revitalization,
EPA.GOV,
www.epa.gov/brownfields/basic_info.htm (last updated July 16, 2012).
49. Id.
50. Announcement and Publication of Guidance on Agreements With Prospective Purchasers of
Contaminated Property and Model Prospective Purchaser Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. 34732, 3479234798 (July 3, 1995), available at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1995-07-03/pdf/95-16282.pdf.
51. Id.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1991).
53. Flannary P. Collins, The Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act:
A Critique, 13 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 303 (2003) (citing 147 CONG. REC. S3,879, S3,892 (daily
ed. Apr. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Boxer)).
54. Casey Cohn, The Brownfields Revitalization and Environmental Restoration Act: Landmark
Reform or a “Trap for the Unwary”?, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 672, 679-80 (2004). See also Gregory
D. Trimarche, Commentary, CERCLA’s New Prospective Purchaser Defense, 23 NO. 9 ANDREWS
HAZARDOUS WASTE LITIG. REP. 12 (2002) (discussing a number of the criteria that was required
before a PPA was approved, including a substantial likelihood of federal response at the site, the PPA
had to result in a “substantial public benefit,” the development could not exacerbate any existing
contamination, and others.).
55. Gregory D. Trimarche, Commentary, CERCLA’s New Prospective Purchaser Defense, 23
NO. 9 ANDREWS HAZARDOUS WASTE LITIG. REP. 12 (2002).
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brownfield redevelopment.56 Without a PPA covenant not to sue, a private
developer could become liable without contributing any contamination at
the site.57 Consequently, these PPAs did not have the desired effect of
increasing and incentivizing development of brownfields. Developers
might, instead, seek to develop on greenfields.58
Greenfields
development, in turn, increases urban sprawl and reduces tax revenues to
the municipality.59 One author notes that this issue raises environmental
justice concerns as well, due to the fact that abandoned or unused
brownfields are usually located in economically depressed communities.60
The EPA, faced with the administrative burden of negotiating PPAs and
the desire to encourage brownfield redevelopment, supported legislative
action to address these problems.61
C. The Brownfields Amendments
In 2002, President Bush signed the Small Business and Brownfields
Revitalization Act into law.62 The law’s purpose is to “provide certain
relief for small businesses from liability under [CERCLA], and to amend
such Act to promote the cleanup and reuse of brownfields[.]”63 This law
amended portions of CERCLA, and notably, clarified certain liability
defenses, including the addition of the BFPP liability defense.64
The Senate, in committee discussions on the proposed amendment,
reported general findings of fact that included estimates of between
600,000 and 1,000,000 brownfield sites in the U.S.65 Greenfields faced
increased development pressures in rural areas as prospective purchasers
sought to avoid CERCLA liability associated with brownfields.66 The
presence of brownfields in urban areas causes blight and increased
56. Collins, supra note 53, at 309.
57. Id.
58. Collins, supra note 53, at 303.
59. Id.
60. Id. (discussing the problem of “mothballing” properties, i.e., leaving sites unremediated).
61. See infra Part IV.B. See also Trimarche, supra note 55 (stating that “To a large extent, the
new prospective purchaser defense is simply an outgrowth of the EPA’s old administrative policy on
prospective purchaser agreements… as anyone who has negotiated a PPA can attest, these projectspecific PPAs were quite cumbersome to negotiate, and often created as many problems as they
solved”).
62. Laws & Statutes, Brownfields, EPA.GOV, http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/laws/index.htm
(last updated July 16, 2012); Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub.
L. No. 107-118, 115 Stat. 2356 (2002).
63. Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-118,
115 Stat. 2356 (2002) (emphasis added).
64. Id.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(40) (2002), 9607(q)(1)(C) (2002).
65. S. REP. NO. 107-244, at 2 (2002).
66. Id.
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environmental and human health risks in those communities, especially
those that were already disproportionately affected.67 The Senate sought
to encourage brownfields development because it recognized the benefits
to local communities, such as utilizing already-existing city infrastructure,
adding to the local tax base, attracting new businesses and jobs, and
relieving the development pressures on greenfields.68 Additionally, the
Senate specifically noted that developers avoid brownfields, including
“abandoned sites, even those with little or no contamination,” because the
risk of being held liable for the full cost of the remediation under CERCLA
exceeded the property value of the site.69
The BFPP liability defense permits a developer to knowingly
purchase a contaminated facility while avoiding liability as a PRP,
provided the developer acquires the facility after January 11, 2002 and the
BFPP establishes eight criteria by a preponderance of the evidence.70 This
is a defense against any action for cost recovery by any other PRP, given
the strict, joint and several liability nature of CERCLA. The BFPP defense
was largely considered “an outgrowth of the EPA’s old administrative
policy on [PPAs].”71
Prior to the amendments, if a PPA was not secured, the main defense
against CERCLA liability was the innocent landowner defense.72
However, a brownfield by definition is a contaminated site, and, thus, this
defense was of no use to a developer who wished to voluntarily develop a
brownfield. The innocent landowner defense, as opposed to the BFPP
defense, requires the party claiming the defense to exercise due care with
regard to the release of hazardous substances caused by “an act or
omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the defendant
… taking into consideration the characteristics” of said substance “in light
of all relevant facts and circumstances.”73
The addition of the BFPP defense created another means by which a
developer or landowner could avoid CERCLA liability. However, the use
67. S. REP. NO. 107-2, at 1-2 (2001)(disproportionately affected communities implicate
environmental justice issues).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40)(A)-(H) (2002); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(q)(1)(C) (2002). The BFPP defense,
of course, is only raised if and when another party brings a cost recovery action against the prospective
purchaser under CERCLA.
71. Trimarche, supra note 55.
72. See generally Keith H. Johnson, Overview of the Small Business Liability Relief and
Brownfields Revitalization Act, P.S. Publications (Jan. 1, 2004), available at
http://www.poynerspruill.com/publications/pages/overviewofthesmallbusinessliabilityreliefandbrow
nfieldsrevitalizationact.aspx.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (2002).
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of appropriate care within the BFPP defense caused some confusion
among attorneys and developers.74 Initial speculation ran from appropriate
care imposing a higher standard of care than due care, to a lower standard
of care. This uncertainty regarding the level of care required under
“appropriate care” only increased uncertainty surrounding potential
liability under CERCLA.75
If developers believed that appropriate care would require a higher
standard of care than due care, or if appropriate care was an uncertain
standard, then logically they would continue to rely on PPAs, even if they
were cumbersome. At the very least, a PPA guaranteed protection from
CERCLA liability. Appropriate care, at the time of the Amendments and
for some time thereafter, was an unknown variable for prospective
purchasers.
The EPA issued guidance on the Amendments, relied on by the
Fourth Circuit in Ashley II76, that sought to clarify the BFPP, innocent
landowners, and contiguous property owner limitations on liability.77 The
guidance recognized congressional intent to incentivize owners of
contaminated property by providing additional defenses to CERCLA
liability.78 By “acting responsibly” in the presence of hazardous
substances, certain owners could avoid placement into the PRP pool.79 It
is odd then that, according to the EPA, this liability defense does nothing
more than adopt already existing “due care” principles. The only
meaningful difference between these two guidelines is that the BFPP
knows the property is contaminated prior to purchase, and the innocent
landowner does not, despite exercising due diligence prior to acquisition.
However, even with EPA guidance, the scope of appropriate care
was still largely unknown as no federal court made a definitive ruling on
it prior to the Fourth Circuit in Ashley II.80

74. Cohn, supra note 54, at 699.
75. Collins, supra note 53, at 323.
76. Ashley II, 714 F.3d at 180; Supra note 36.
77. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Interim Guidance Regarding Criteria Landowners Must Meet
in Order to Qualify for Bona Fide Prospective Purchaser, Contiguous Property Owner, or Innocent
Landowner Limitations on CERCLA Liability (Mar. 6, 2003) [hereinafter, EPA Mar. 6, 2003
Guidance].
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Although, I would argue that Ashley II did not reach a definitive ruling on the level of care
required because the facts relied upon by Ashley to establish the BFPP defense were unfavorable.
Namely, Ashley’s own expert’s admittance that sumps should have been filled in a year before it was
actually done. See supra note 30.
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IV. THE NEED FOR CLARITY: LOWERING THE STANDARD OF CARE FOR
BFPPS
The EPA, or Congress, should redefine the standard for appropriate
care as one that imposes less stringent duties on the prospective purchaser
than due care. This lesser standard of care is consistent with the purpose
of the 2002 amendments, helps to incentivize private development of
brownfields, and reflects the quasi-utilitarian nature of many federal
environmental statutes. This lower standard will ease pressure on
greenfield development while continuing to promote the benefits of the
Brownfields Program.
A. New Standard for Appropriate Care
Appropriate care should be a lower standard than due care under the
Brownfields Amendments and CERCLA. At the very least, a defined and
clear standard of care provides some certainty in the risky area of private
brownfield development and makes an important distinction between the
two standards of care cited within CERCLA. Appropriate care should
require a property owner (i.e., the prospective purchaser) to take the
minimal steps necessary to prevent imminent releases, cut off exposure
pathways, and stabilize existing conditions when these modest, immediate
measures could prevent exacerbation of hazardous conditions. This level
of care would require parties claiming the BFPP defense to show by the
preponderance of the evidence that they did not make the situation worse,
while not necessarily requiring them to conduct a full-scale cleanup at the
initial stages of remediation and development. Alternately, appropriate
care should require the prospective purchaser to adhere to the performance
mandates as dictated by a relevant state agency.81 The relevant state
agency would establish performance mandates that the prospective
purchaser must follow in order to receive liability protection.
In 3000 E. Imperial, LLC v. Robertshaw Controls Co., the U.S
District Court for the Central District of California addressed the question
of whether the plaintiff exercised appropriate care as a BFPP when the
defendant, asserting that the plaintiff was a PRP, brought a counterclaim
for cost recovery.82 In that case, the plaintiff worked with the California
Department of Toxic Substances (DTSC) on a coordinated voluntary
cleanup of a contaminated property purchased by the plaintiff in 2006.83

81. An example is provided in the case discussion that follows this paragraph.
82. 3000 E. Imperial, LLC v. Robertshaw Controls Co., CV 08-3985 PA EX, 2010 WL 5464296
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2010).
83. Id. at 1, 11.
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The property was a former manufacturing site with underground storage
tanks (USTs).84 The plaintiff knew the site was contaminated prior to
purchase.85 An environmental consulting firm that was hired by the
plaintiff to investigate the contamination concluded that the groundwater
was contaminated.86 The Court recognized that the California Health and
Safety Code mirrored CERLCA’s BFPP definition.87 However, the
California statute defined “appropriate care” as merely requiring a BFPP
to adhere to the response actions directed by DTSC—a narrower
requirement.88
In 300 E. Imperial, the issue was whether the plaintiff’s two-year
delay in removing the USTs was “unreasonable” and, thus, violative of
“appropriate care.”89 The Court found that draining the USTs of
contaminants was a “reasonable step” towards stopping any continuing
leak and preventing future leaks.90 The defendant, Whittaker Corporation,
argued that the USTs should have been excavated after draining in order
to prevent “surface water infiltration.”91 The Court held that it was not
“unreasonable,” as the defendant urged, for the plaintiff to leave the USTs
in the ground for upwards of two years.92 The plaintiff was entitled to the
BFPP liability defense because the sampling and draining of the USTs
constituted “appropriate care.”
Applying the Court’s analysis in the 3000 E. Imperial, LLC case to
the Ashley II case, it is arguable that the exercise of appropriate care would
merely require Ashley to take reasonable steps to prevent the sumps from
leeching and ensuring that the debris did not leave the premises. Ashley
could simply take minimal steps to control or contain the storm-water
filled sumps, rather than conduct a full remediation as could be required
under due care. Appropriate care, under the proposed standard, would
require Ashley to not make the situation worse, but the standard will not
go so far as to demand full remediation at the initial stages of
redevelopment. In 3000 E. Imperial, LLC, the plaintiff conducted the
necessary environmental investigation upon acquiring the site, and drained
the USTs. The plaintiff did not immediately or within the first year remove
the USTs from underground. Similarly, Ashley, under the proposed
84. Id. at 1.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 11.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 12.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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standard, could simply act to prevent contaminated sump water from
leeching or spilling during the initial stages of redevelopment and keep
debris from spreading. By preventing the conditions at the site from
significantly deteriorating, Ashley would avoid PRP liability.
B. The Purpose of the Amendments
The proposed lesser standard for appropriate care also finds some
support in the legislative history leading up to the enacting of the
Brownfields Amendments. First, the very purpose of the Amendments was
to “promote the cleanup and reuse of brownfields.”93 The EPA supported
the Amendments because, presumably, the new BFPP defense would
eliminate or reduce the need for PPAs, which were burdensome and
ineffective for encouraging rapid development of brownfields.94 If a
private developer was choosing between a BFPP defense, which the
Fourth Circuit held to require the same level of care as due care, and a
PPA, which, although cumbersome to negotiate, guarantees liability
defense, logic and rational business judgment would dictate selecting the
latter. This result defeats the very purpose of the BFPP defense.
Evidence prior to the adoption of the Brownfields Amendments
suggests that a lower standard of care was envisioned. Gregory
Trimarche—an attorney specializing in brownfields transactions and
environmental litigation as well as writing about the Amendments—
reported on discussions he had with a “senior EPA official.”95 The official
“indicated a belief that the new appropriate-care standard should be read
simply as requiring the new owner to take the minimal steps necessary to
prevent imminent releases, cut off exposure pathways, and stabilize
existing conditions when modest, immediate measures could prevent” an
exacerbation of the contamination.96 Trimarche’s interpretation was that
appropriate care could be read to merely require preventing “a bad
situation from becoming worse.”97 Indeed, for some time preceding the
Amendments, there appeared to be a few legislators willing to wholly
exempt prospective purchasers from any CERCLA liability.98
93. Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-118,
115 Stat. 2356 (2002).
94. Trimarche, supra note 55.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See 141 CONG. REC. E1623 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1995) (statement of Rep. Robert Borski) (“The
bill also includes protection for prospective purchasers—people who want to buy property but may be
scared away by the potential liability. Under this bill, prospective purchasers who have no connection
with the waste disposal will be shielded from liability.”); 141 CONG. REC. E1622 (daily ed. Aug. 3,
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The EPA’s March 6, 2003 guidance on the new CERCLA liability
defenses interprets the “reasonable steps” required of contiguous
landowners, BFPPs, and innocent landowners as “consonant with
traditional common law principles and the existing CERCLA ‘due care’
requirement.”99 However, according to the EPA, these “reasonable steps”
may differ depending on the type of liability defense asserted.100 EPA
describes these “reasonable steps” as reflecting the balance Congress
sought between liability protection for types of landowners and protection
of human health and the environment.101 Additionally, the EPA noted that
“due care” under the pre-Brownfields Amendments CERCLA liability
differs from the “reasonable steps” required under the Brownfields
Amendments.102 “Due care,” according to the EPA, is a “reference point
for evaluating the reasonable steps requirement.”103
The purported goals of the Amendments were, in part, to encourage
development of brownfields and alleviate the fear of CERCLA liability.104
The EPA guidance indicates a lack of clearly defined steps for the standard
of care required under the Brownfields Amendments. Instead, whether
“due care” or “appropriate care,” a private developer105 may only rely on
reference points as to what “reasonable steps” it must take in the presence
of hazardous substances. One can imagine the scenario in which a private
developer takes what it believes to be appropriate “reasonable steps” only
1995) (statement of Rep. Richard Gephardt) (“…this legislation provides protection for good faith
prospective purchasers…Under Superfund, the owner of a contaminated tract of land may be held
responsible for cleaning it up even if the pollution was created by the prior owner. Thus, potential
purchasers are often deterred from investing in sites with potential contamination. This provision
allows a purchaser who checks the site carefully before purchase to avoid liability…”) [Rep. Gephardt
discusses both “good faith prospective purchasers” and “innocent landowners” and uses the terms
somewhat interchangeably.]; Katherine X. Vasiliades, Encouraging Industry in Order to Preserve
Non-Commercial Property, 9 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 29, 53-55 (1988) (discussing Sen. Smith’s
introduction of the Accelerated Cleanup and Environmental Restoration Act of 1995 “as a bill to
reauthorize and amend CERCLA… the bill protected purchasers from liability provided the purchaser
conducted satisfactory inquiries prior to purchaser of the property and did not exacerbate the
contamination.”).
99. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra, note 77.
100. Id. (stating that “The reasonable steps determination will be a site-specific, fact-based
inquiry.”).
101. Id.
102. Id. (“CERCLA requires the exercise of ‘due care with respect to the hazardous substances
concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all the
relevant facts and circumstances; CERCLA § 107(b)(3)(a).”).
103. Id.
104. S. REP. NO. 107-2, at 2 (2001).
105. A private developer who was aware of the presence of hazardous substances would seek
BFPP liability protection (“appropriate care”). The innocent landowner liability defense would apply
to the private developer that did not know of the presence of hazardous substances despite making the
appropriate inquiries (“due care”).
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to come under CERCLA liability as a PRP through a later “site-specific,
fact-based inquiry,”106 thus providing no greater level of confidence for
the private developer seeking to redevelop a brownfield.107
C. Incentivizing Brownfields Development
A new, lower standard for appropriate care will incentivize
development through the removal of a tricky variable within the
brownfields development calculus. The Senate recognized that
“abandoned sites, even those with little or no contamination” are left
unremediated due to “fear that cleanup costs could exceed the property
value [and] reduce incentives for redevelopment.”108 The potential high
costs of cleanup, in addition to the fear of CERCLA liability, are “primary
factors” that drive developers towards the less risky greenfields.109 The
liability risks also prevent willing developers from obtaining necessary
loans and insurance.110
By clearly defining the limits of appropriate care to be a lesser
standard than due care, loan providers and insurers are provided a greater
guarantee that the project is not likely to result in costly litigation and
recovery costs. Additionally, developers are provided some assurance that
voluntarily taking on a brownfield will not result in liability as long as they
do not make the contamination worse. Certainly, it would be in the best
interest of the developer to perform a full remediation prior to project
completion. A new appropriate care standard can at least prevent costly
liability during the initial stages of project development.
D. Harmony with Other Federal Environmental Statutes
Lowering the burden for what qualifies as “appropriate care” for
CERCLA liability is harmonious with many of the current federal
environmental statutes. Statutory programs like the Clean Air Act (CAA)
and the Clean Water Act (CWA) reflect a quasi-utilitarian approach to
environmental problems. Utilitarianism is a philosophy that provides, in
basic terms, that the “morally good action is one that helps the greatest

106. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra, note 77 (stating that “The reasonable steps
determination will be a site-specific, fact-based inquiry.”).
107. Frank B. Cross, Bona fide prospective purchaser exemption, 1 Fed. ENVIR. REG. OF REAL
ESTATE § 2:51 (2014) (“…what constitutes due care for purposes of the [BFPP] exemption will
likewise require a case-by-case analysis of the particular facts and circumstances.”).
108. S. REP. NO. 107-2, at 2 (2001).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2-3.
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number of people.”111 In other words, an action is proper when the
consequences of that action benefit the greatest number of people.
Utilitarianism can be described, in the context of environmental
regulation, as a cost-benefit analysis in that weighs the cost of preventing
pollution with the benefits to human health and the environment. The CAA
and the CWA, two major federal environmental statutes, illustrate this
cost-benefit analysis.
The CAA, in part, regulates the emissions of air pollutants from
stationary and mobile sources.112 The CAA does not, however, prohibit all
emissions of air pollutants. Rather, sources of air pollutants must comply
with the CAA by obtaining permits, which set the effective emissions
limits for that source.113 Part C of the CAA requires a preconstruction
permit for a proposed facility to be subject to the best available control
technology (BACT) for regulated air pollutants.114 The EPA, or other
permitting authority, sets BACT on a case-by-case basis by considering
“energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs…”115 Best
available control technology explicitly mandates a type of cost-benefit
analysis. The statute does not require the most stringent emissions limit
technology. Rather, it only requires that the permitting authority set the
BACT for each applicant by weighing environmental and economic
impacts along with other costs. The CAA reflects a conscious decision by
policymakers to incorporate a cost-benefit analysis in determining
emissions limitations, rather than a broad, strict standard of care.
The CWA, by regulating the effluent emission into waterways, also
implements a similar permitting program for discrete, point sources.116
The CWA, like the CAA, does not prohibit all pollution. It only sets
emissions limits for pollution sources. The National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) allows the EPA to issue permits for the
discharge of any pollutant, provided certain conditions are met.117 The
NPDES permitting program does not prohibit any pollutant discharge.
Rather, it permits some if other certain statutory conditions are met.

111.
Utilitarianism
definition,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/utilitarianism (last visited Mar. 15, 2014).
112. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7431 (1970).
113. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air Quality, 42 U.S.C. § 7470-7479 (1977);
Plan Requirements for Nonattainment Areas, 42 U.S.C. § 7501-7509(a) (1977); and Title V Permits,
42 U.S.C. § 7661-7661(f) (1990).
114. 42 U.S.C.§ 7475(a)(4) (1977).
115. 42 U.S.C. §7479 (C)(3) (1977) (emphasis added).
116. See generally, Summary of the Clean Water Act, EPA.GOV, http://www2.epa.gov/lawsregulations/summary-clean-water-act (last updated Mar. 16, 2014).
117. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1972).
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Relatedly, the Supreme Court ruled that the EPA is permitted to
conduct a cost-benefit analysis for regulations promulgated under § 1326
of the CWA.118 In Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, petitioners challenged
EPA regulations that “permit the issuance of site-specific variances from
national performance standards if a facility can demonstrate either that the
costs of compliance are ‘significantly greater than’ the costs considered by
the agency in setting the standards, or that the costs of compliance ‘would
be significantly greater than the benefits of complying with the applicable
performance standards.’”119 The EPA’s regulations, upheld by the Court,
were based on its interpretation that the statutory requirement of “best
technology available” permitted consideration of technology cost against
the environmental benefits produced.120 The EPA did not have to select
the “best technology available” based only on the environmental benefits
produced. It was permitted to weigh those environmental benefits against
the costs to the facility.
Similarly, lowering the standard of care under appropriate care for
BFPPs reflects a policy choice: weighing the benefits of further
incentivizing brownfields against the potential human health and
environmental risks associated with implementing the new standard.
Namely, the risks of orphaned brownfields for which there are no PRPs
available for cost recovery, and the delays in full remediation at the site
are weighed against the harms of leaving a brownfield site unclaimed and
undeveloped. The reported rationale underlying the Amendments121 is
weighed against the risks of implementing the new standard. If brownfield
development is important, then other development incentives should be
considered. The benefits of increased brownfields development122
outweigh the risks of harm stemming from the lowered standard.
D. The Limitations
Of course, lowering the standard of care for BFPPs may not result in
any increase in brownfields development. After all, a BFPP defense
requires a prospective purchaser to establish eight criteria by the
preponderance of the evidence.123 Simply changing one criterion will not
prevent a developer from becoming liable under CERCLA. Further, a
prospective purchaser voluntarily acquires a contaminated site. A new
118. Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009).
119. Id. at 216.
120. Id. at 217-18.
121. See supra Part IV.B.
122. See supra Part III.C.
123. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40)(A)-(H) (2002).
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appropriate care standard may not affect the cost-risk calculation for the
developer, especially when the developer would still conduct a full
cleanup as a prudent business practice or still seek a PPA. Finally, there
are many other variables that could affect brownfields development,
including loan and insurance availability, profit projections, and other
standard business considerations.
V. CRITIQUES
Many criticisms likely exist towards this development-developer
friendly approach for brownfields redevelopment. There are many more
than were contemplated or that can be addressed in this article. However,
I will attempt to counter a few notable criticisms of this suggested
approach.
One question that may arise is what justifies the different treatment
of innocent landowners and BFPPs. An innocent landowner, by definition,
does not cause or contribute to the contamination, nor does the innocent
landowner know of the presence of hazardous substances.124 The
difference in treatment is easily resolved if the purpose of the lower
standard of care under appropriate care is to encourage developers to
knowingly take on brownfields development. The reward for voluntarily
acquiring brownfields is that the developer is less likely to become a PRP
absent some egregious or patently deficient action. The prospective
purchaser knows it is purchasing a brownfield125 and will, as any prudent
business or person would do, ensure a full remediation by the end of the
project. Prior to completion of the project, liability should not attach nor
should the developer be compelled to assert the defense. An innocent
landowner may have no intention of conducting a redevelopment or full
remediation of the site.126 The prospective purchaser, conversely, knows
the site is contaminated and should not face the penalty of becoming a PRP
unless and until the project is completed.
Some may argue that lowering the standard of care would reward
potentially substandard remediation efforts. However, the lesser standard
under appropriate care would not provide a developer with complete
protection from liability. For example, a developer who purchases a
brownfield but does not take the modest or minimal steps necessary to
prevent the spread of hazardous substances would receive no protection
against PRP liability even under the new standard. This type of action is

124. See supra note 70.
125. Which is, by definition, contaminated with hazardous substances.
126. This is inherent in the definition of the innocent landowner defense.
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akin to taking no action. Further, a developer faces other avenues of
liability even if the standard of care is lowered. First, as was the case in
Ashley II, Ashley failed to establish all of the eight criteria required for the
BFPP defense.127 Even if Ashley exercised appropriate care under a lower
standard, it failed to establish all of the BFPP criteria by a preponderance
of the evidence.128 A lesser standard of appropriate care does not equate
to no liability under the BFPP defense. Second, a developer may still face
toxic tort liability129, any state hazardous waste laws, or liability under the
Resource, Conservation, and Recovery Act (RCRA) citizen suit provision,
amongst others.130
One final hurdle towards implementing a lesser standard is the
informal EPA practice of preferring “one man left standing” for
brownfields,131 which seeks to ensure that the present site owner, or some
party, will perform a full remediation rather than leaving the site
orphaned.132 Providing a means for avoiding liability to purchasers may
leave brownfields without a known PRP.133 This should be of little
concern if the goal of the Amendments is to promote the reuse of
brownfields. A prospective purchaser taking on a brownfield would ensure
that full cleanup at the site would occur prior to project completion or
engaging in a subsequent real estate transaction to prevent PRP liability.134
Consequently, there should be less incentive by the EPA to seek out other
parties for recovery costs.

127. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40)(A)-(H) (2002) (listing the criteria as follows: whether all disposals of
hazardous substances occurred before acquisition; performing all appropriate inquiries; making all
legally required notices; exercising appropriate care; providing full cooperation, assistance and access
to authorized response persons; compliance with land use restrictions and to not impede any
institutional control at the site; compliance with requests and subpoenas; and having no affiliation with
a PRP).
128. Ashley II of Charleston, LLC v. PCS Nitrogen, Inc., 791 F. Supp.2d 431, 499 (D.S.C. 2011)
(Ashley failed to show that no disposals occurred on the site after Ashley’s acquisition).
129. A common law claim. See generally N. Kathleen Strickland, Toxic Torts: An Overview,
GP SOLO LAW TRENDS & NEWS REAL ESTATE (May 2005), www.americanbar.org/new
sletter/publications/law_trends_news_practice_area_e_newsletter_home/toxictorts.html.
130. 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1980). However, no action may be commenced if the Administrator or
State has commenced a civil or criminal action against the alleged violator, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)(B)
(1980).
131. Trimarche, supra note 55.
132. Id.
133. Of course, the BFPP defense is an affirmative one, protecting the site owner from suits from
other PRPs for apportionment or contribution of cleanup fees. It may be unlikely that removing the
current owner from the PRP pool has any effect on other parties to recover for cleanup costs leaves a
site truly orphaned, especially if the current owner does not have to assert the BFPP defense because
no other party is seeking to recover cleanup costs against the purchaser.
134. See supra Part III.A.

2015]

Appropriate Care Under the Brownfield Amendments

45

VI. CONCLUSION
Congress or the EPA should act to formally adopt a lower standard
of care for appropriate care for BFPPs under the Brownfields
Amendments. Appropriate care for BFPPs should impose a less stringent
duty than traditional due care under CERCLA and the common law.
Appropriate care should require that the property owner or developer take
the minimal steps necessary to prevent imminent releases of hazardous
substances, cut off exposure pathways, and stabilize existing condition
when these modest, immediate measures could prevent a bad situation
from becoming worse. In the alternative, appropriate care should be
defined as following the performance standards and mandates required by
the relevant state agency.
The Fourth Circuit’s ruling in Ashley II, that appropriate care is
synonymous with due care, reflects a poor policy choice in light of the
purpose of the Amendments. Granted, federal appellate courts are not
where policy choices are made. This job is better left to the elected
branches and to the administrative agencies charged with implementing
federal statutes.
Congress, in the time leading up to the Amendments, recognized that
private developers were not incentivized to voluntarily take on
brownfields development. These private developers faced the risk of
becoming liable as a PRP under CERCLA, even if only minimally
contributing to the contamination. A lower standard of care can ease
development pressures off less risky greenfields while still providing the
many benefits associated with brownfields program. This new standard is
also harmonious with the current quasi-utilitarian nature of federal
environmental statutes. The benefits of brownfields redevelopment,
including reducing urban blight and urban sprawl, as well as increasing
the tax base for the local government, outweigh the interim risk of
spreading or exacerbating hazardous contamination. After all, the prudent
developer would still perform a full cleanup prior to project completion in
order to avoid liability under toxic torts, state hazardous waste laws, and
other environmental liability. The lower standard only guarantees that the
private developer is less likely to become a PRP through any cost recovery
actions during the initial redevelopment stages.
Finally, it is recognized that a lower standard of care is no panacea
towards spurring brownfields development. There are many other
variables at play that help to determine whether or not a private party will
voluntarily take on a brownfield. Doing nothing only maintains the status
quo and leaves urban centers blighted. A new standard is one way in which
the scales can be tipped in favor of brownfields development.
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